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Abstract
In this OPEC crisis or the next, oil prices may fall to the
competitive floor. At the high-cost end of the spectrum, it would
take a price as low as $4 to produce an immediate shutdown of nearly
half of capacity in the United States, and as low as $2 to do the
same in the North Sea. A price of $10 would stop development
investment for the bulk of U.S. oil and over a third of North Sea
oil. Capacity would therefore decline by roughly 6 percent per year.
At the low-cost end, assuming continued competition and completely
independent decision-making, a price of $5 would make it profitable
for the OPEC nations to expand output to about 60 million barrels
daily. This price would be sustainable past 1995. This projection
is not a forecast, however.
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half of capacity in the United States, and as low as $2 to do the
same in the North Sea. A price of $10 would stop development
investment for the bulk of U. S. oil and over a third of North
Sea oil. Capacity would therefore decline.
At the low-cost end, assuming competition and completely
independent decision-making, a price of $5 would make it profit-
able for the OPEC nations to expand output to over 60 million
barrels daily. The price would be sustainable past 1995 at the
1 It is hard to imagine any greater encouragement than to
hear from the Vice President of the United States how much pain
they are inflicting. One is reminded of how an Undersecretary of
State was despatched to the Persian Gulf in January 1971 to
inform the producers there of how much damage they would inflict
by an embargo. These lessons are learned.
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Shutdown- Costs --far -North Sea -and USA
We take account only of strictly economic costs,
disregarding taxes, royalties, and other charges, which vary from
country to country. They can and will be changed by governments,
in response to the bad news. Those quicker to adapt will be
penalized less than the more stubborn.
[TABLE I HERE]
Operatin-g --costs As Table I shows, during 1983-84,
operating costs in the British North Sea averaged a little over
$2 per barrel. From what is known about the distribution of
those costs [OGJ, 1986a], approximately 60 percent of North Sea
oil is produced at or below average cost, and 80 percent is
produced at or below twice the average. Hence it would take a
price as low as $4 to reduce North Sea output by 20 percent.
[TABLE II HERE]
In the United States, as Table II shows, 1982 average
operating costs were $4.84, which we have reduced to just under
$4 to take account of a decline since then.[DOE/EIA 1986, table
El] Since they include some allocation of overhead, they
overstate true variable costs. In the 1960s, the distribution of
well costs seemed to have a longer thinner "tail" than in the
North Sea. About 65 percent of production was at or below
average cost, and another 30 percent at or below twice the
average.
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2 For example, the Kern River field in 1985 had 6254 wells
producing 139 thousand barrels daily. [Oil & Gas Journal, January
27, 1986, p. 104] Average output was thus 22 bd per well. In
early 1986, 1500 wells were closed, which had produced 17 tbd, an
average of 11 bd per well. [Wall Street Journal, March 12,
1986, p. 5] Thus the highest-cost 12 percent of output was
produced at a cost about twice the average for the field.
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6Whether the eight-fold return in nine years (26 percent per
year) is "good enough" depends of course on the risk attached to
it. Or to state the problem a little differently: considering
production in 1995 as an option, how much would it be worth
in the market?
The need to ask these questions is more important than any
answer. Discussion of the oil market has long been plagued with
such confusions as the alleged "wide gap between full and
marginal costs"; if "full cost" means average cost, then marginal
cost may be much more or much less. A false assumption which
cripples thought is that the price floor is "the out-of-pocket
cost of the last barrels", because investment is a "sunken
cost". If this were true, nearly every single industry would
show wild price gyrations at all times,
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reserves.
Development cost Table I shows that oil development
investment in the U.K. North Sea was about $5.5 billion in
1983-84 (converting the pound sterling at $1.50). Since output
was equal to capacity, the increase from 2.029 to 2.449 million
barrels daily represented a net capacity gain of 420,000 b/d over
two years. But since there was a continuing decline in old
reservoirs, the capacity lost and replaced during those two years
must be added back. This can be approximated by assuming that
the ratio of production to reserves is about equal to the decline
rate, as would be true under conditions of constant exponential
decline for an unlimited period.3 There is reason to think this
exaggerates the decline rate for 1984, but the error is offset by
an error in the opposite direction. (See next paragraph.)
The North Sea development outlay of about $5600 per initial
daily barrel is for a diminishing flow. The amount per barrel
which would make production just barely worthwhile is found by
multiplying the investment by the sum of the depletion/decline
Thus if initial output = Q, and the annual decline
rate = a, output in any year t = Q= Q e-at, and proved reserves
R = Q e- a t dt = Q/a or a = Q/R.
rate and the minimum acceptable rate of return.4 I n t h e
U. S. capital market in early 1986, the riskless rate of return,
on U. S. Treasury bonds, was about 8 percent. It has declined
because of lower inflation, and may decline further. Adding the
risk premium on oil operations, which according to various
researchers seems historically to be about 8 percent, yields a
total 16 percent. Added to the apparent 13.5 percent decline
rate (which constitutes the offset), a total return of 29.5
percent is necessary: initial year cash flow as percent of
up-front investment.5
In the United States, development expenditures were
calculated by using the 1984 Joint Association Survey to update
what is unfortunately the last (1982) issue of the Census Annual
Survey- of Oil & Gas. Division of total development expenditures
That is, NPV = PQ S 00 e-(a+i)t dt - K = 0
Then PQ/(a+i) = K
and P = (K/Q)(a+i) = supply price
5 The risk premium on oil operations is a thorny ques-
tion, of course. Recent price declines might be a reason for
increasing it. Yet since 1973, oil price changes have been if
anything negatively correlated with changes in incomes and asset
values generally. Hence the covariance with the general asset
market may not be much more than that of other kinds of company
share ownership.
If we could assume that oil prices will henceforth move
approximately with the general price level, we would use the
real not the nominal cost of capital, not 16 percent but 10
percent. Then the total required return would be 23.5 percent.
The same is true for the United States and other areas, as set
forth below.
9between oil and gas was made in proportion to the respective
drilling development expenditures. An estimate of the increment
to capacity would be a much less reliable number than the gross
addition to reserves, which in 1984 was 3748 million barrels, or
$3.78 per barrel in the ground. 6 We are forced to exclude
natural gas liquids (from associated-dissolved gas production),
since this number is no longer compiled by DOE/EIA. [DOE/EIA
1984] This results in a small cost overstatement.
The in-ground cost per barrel is converted into a wellhead
cost per barrel by a method which is mathematically equivalent to
the one used for the North Sea. [Adelman 1986, Appendix A] The
cost of holding the reserve barrel until produced and sold off
varies directly with the cost of capital, and inversely with the
depletion/decline rate; the quicker it is produced, the cheaper
to hold. In the United States, where i=the discount rate and
a=the depletion/decline rate, the multiplier (1+(i/a)) =
(1+(.16/.115)) = 2.39. Hence the average development cost at the
wellhead is reckoned at $9.04.
If the real not the nominal discount rate is used, the
multiplier is (1+(.10/.115))=1.87, and wellhead cost = $7.07.
This would be relevant if and when one thought the price of oil
had really gone to competitive equilibrium levels, and would
6 Another fortuitous resemblance: 3.78 is not 3748 scaled
down.
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henceforth fluctuate with the general price level, modified by
its own supply and demand.
Summary:- UK & USA In the North Sea, the sum of average
operating plus development costs is a bit less than $7 per
barrel. Therefore a $7 price, net of all taxes, would support
continued development of about half the U.K. fields. At $14, or
twice the average, nearly all fields would still be worth further
development. In the United States, average development-plus-
operating cost is about $13, so a $14 price would stop
development in fields accounting for nearly half the total. A
price of $10 per barrel would stop development investment for the
bulk of U. S. oil and over a third of North Sea oil.7 (For
effects on exploration, see below, p. 11.)
At this point, we must digress to deal with a widely-cited
estimate which cannot be reconciled with the real world.
The myth of "$70,000 per daily barrel in non-OPEC'
A little mental arithmetic shows this is impossible. It is
twelve times the 1983-84 average for the British North Sea, and
would therefore require a price of over $85, after taxes, to
break even. (That is, ($70,000/$5300)*($4.43+$2.12)=$86.51.) In
The distribution of development costs probably has not
as long a tail as operating costs, because development costs are
a larger portion of the total. Hence a price double the average
of development cost would preclude a somewhat higher portion of
the total than a price double the average of operating cost.
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the United States, the breakeven price would be even higher.
Not long ago, most oilmen doubtless believed such a price
was coming--some day. But to suppose they spent billions up front
at this rate, for years on end, without losing their shirts,
their jobs, or their companies to takeovers or stockholders'
suits, is not credible. Even in 1982, when reputable consulting
firms were predicting $200 per barrel, a North Sea development
was cancelled because it would have cost $4 billion to develop
about 300 million barrels [NYT 1982], very roughly $44,000 per
daily barrel. 8 Thus even around
investment only 63 percent of the
out.
the height of the delusion, an
supposed average cost was ruled
Finding cost (resource value) We have
to now that the decline rate would stay constant.
true. Without newly found reservoirs to "freshen
increasingly intensive development is bound to
percent of reserves depleted every year, and
production decline. That is what happened in the
after about 1965.
A price double the
incentive for exploration
. .~~~~~~~~~~~~
assumed up
That is not
up the mix",
increase the
the rate of
United States
average development cost supplies an
to find low-cost fields. There is some
Let K=investment, Q= initial daily output, R= reserves,
and a=the decline rate. Then as shown earlier, Q=Ra/365. Then
K/Q is equal to (365/a)*(K/R). I a is tken as approximately 11
percent, then K/Q=(365/.11)($4*10 /300*10 )=$44,231.
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indirect evidence bearing on this question: the per-barrel value
of a reserve sold in the ground.
In late 1985, the price of a barrel of oil in a developed
reserve was $6, give or take $1. [OGJ 1985] However, an allow-
ance for the tax benefits of drilling would raise the pre-tax
cost to about $7. If our estimate in Table 2 is correct,
this divides neatly in half, and the value of undeveloped oil in
the ground was $3.50 per barrel. With the collapse of oil prices
since late 1985, this value must today be much lower. Except
where expected finding cost (excluding development) can be
brought this low, or lower, it does not pay to explore.
Unfortunately, we cannot compare the value of an undeveloped
barrel in the ground with the cost of finding it. There are no
data from which to estimate finding costs per unit. There are
data on exploration expenditures, the most recent from 1982. But
there are no data on the amount of newly found oil, aside from
the usual meaningless "finding" which lumps together development
and discovery.
The published EIA statistics on "discoveries" are fragments
masquerading as data. This is because the initial-year estimates
are only a minor fraction of what will ultimately be credited to
a new field or pool. Through 1979, the American Petroleum
Institute and American Gas Association published a valuable
series of backdated oil and gas discovery estimates, but this
13
(and much else) was lost when their series ceased to be pub-
lished, a casualty of mindless hostility to the oil and gas
industry. [Cf. National Academy of Sciences 1985]
Hence we have no information on finding costs per
unit. Estimates published under that heading are meaningless.
However, it seems plausible that not enough can be found even at
$3.50 to maintain the reservoirs. In fact, for many years, most
of the additions to reserves have come from the old fields, both
by improved recovery and by adding to the known oil in place.
To sum up: in the USA and the North Sea, a $20 price
(at which price the Windfall Profits Tax becomes irrelevant)
would make the continued development of known prospects profit-
able, except for extremely high cost wells. It would also supply
an incentive for exploration of good prospects, i. e., those
whose combined cost would not exceed $20. But many leases
would not be worth further investment, and production would
decline slowly, unless costs were sharply reduced.
Costs have of course come far down, and reductions in
deepwater offshore have been dramatic. Hence the currently
(June 1986) reported cutbacks in oil production capital spending
do not mean an equally great a cutback in real effort and
investment. Morever, efficiency is rising steeply, both because
of better use of equipment, and because the poorer prospects are
cut first. The collapse in drilling has not been matched by the
14
number of wells drilled and feet drilled. Rigs operating during
January-February 1986 were a third less than the same months of
1985 [MER 1986], but well completions and footage were actually
a little higher. [OGJ 1986d] Moreover, much of the spending
and drilling cutbacks have been precautionary, a waiting until
the dust settles. In the North Sea and elsewhere, lower taxes
will restore profitability to some projects currently uneconomic.
Other non-cartel areas areas Some resemble the U. S. and
U. K. because they are competitive, and production is carried to
where incremental cost equals price. Here lower prices would
force cutbacks.
But many and probably most non-cartel countries have been
explored and developed below their potential. In such countries,
reserves and production will increase because government and
public opinion are, with agonizing slowness, shedding
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An intermediate price is much harder to
We turn therefore to the low-cost areas, to see what,
under competitive conditions, would be available at such a range
of prices.
The Supply Function in the OPEC Areas
The competitive floor price In 1970, the Persian Gulf
price was $1.20, which at present-day drilling cost levels would
be about $3. Supply was ample, and the price was stable, tending
to decline very slowly. How different would things be in the
1980s and 1990s?
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With no cartel, each producing nation would become a
price-taker. To maximize returns, they would increase output to
where the incremental cost of more production approached the
market price. They might yearn for the good old days of the
cartel, but that would not matter so long as they could do no
more than yearn.
As with the North Sea and USA, we need to know how much
money must be spent to obtain a barrel of daily capacity, to
be translated into a cost per barrel.
[TABLE III HERE] [FIGURE 1 HERE]
Table III shows the calculations underlying Figure 1.
We have the estimated curve for the year 1995, allowing ten years
for some of the OPEC nations to build capacity up to 5 percent of
their proved reserves. The industry rule of thumb is 1/15th
annual depletion, or 6.7 percent. In the U. S. A. and the U. K.,
depletion rates are above 10 percent. (Cf. Tables I and II.)
Our reference year is 1978, the last year before data
were radically distorted by the second price explosion and the
output cutbacks. Line 1 shows the number of wells of all types
completed that year, line 2 the average depth of well. Line 3a
shows the average cost of an onshore well in the USA at that
depth. For Iran and Nigeria, however, we choose not the average
value but the maximum, to allow for exceptionally difficult
drilling conditions. For countries which produce both onshore
and offshore, we multiply by the ratio
Association Survey, of well costs for
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This average is multiplied not by total wells drilled, but only
by new successful oil wells, to yield gross new capacity added,
country by country (line 9b). There is a factor of overstatement
here, because some successful oil wells are exploratory holes,
which in themselves do not add to capacity. However, exploration
was at a low level in these countries, a fact to be discussed
more fully below.
Dividing total investment (line 4) by new capacity added by
drilling (line 9b) yields investment per additional daily barrel
(line 1ob). We must now translate this into cost per barrel by
the same method as was applied to the North Sea.
We assume the production decline to be equal to the 1995
production/reserve percent, in this case 5 percent, as would be
true of exponential decline over an infinite period. Operating
expenses are assumed to be 7 percent of investment. The total
gross rate of return is 36.5 percent, which makes mental
arithmetic easy. (For example, if the investment per daily barrel
is one thousand dollars, then unit cost=$1000*(.05+.07+.245)/365
=$1.) However, this is fortuitous. We assume a cost of capital,
in nominal terms, 24.5 percent. This is half again as high as
what it would be for a private oil and gas operator in the United
States or similar developed countries.9
9 In a forthcoming paper, it will be explained why the
discount rate for an oil-producing country, whose oil income is a
large part of its revenues, must be considerably higher than for
19
The limitations on these estimates are several. First,
like the U. S. but unlike the North Sea, they are strictly
wellhead costs, with no allowance for transport. Second, they
are costs per average well. This involves some opposing biases.
On the one side, the cost per barrel from the average
well may and usually does overstate the cost per barrel from all
wells. This happens when (as in the United States) there is a
long thin tail of small wells. This can be adjusted for by
calculating a weighted average flow rate, weighting the average
flow rate for each field by the production of the field. [Adelman
& Paddock, 1980] A weighted average of all wells would be
preferable but is impossible. The weighted average flow rate is
shown in line 7b. It is usually higher, but sometimes lower,
than the unweighted average in line 7a.
But even an adjusted average cost curve is not a supply
curve. As we pointed out earlier in discussing the USA and the
UK, a substantial fraction, less than half, of the oil is
produced at costs above average. Hence for each country one must
make an allowance for the more expensive output. Our procedure
is to multiply the average cost, line 10b, by 2.5, yielding the
supply curve segment of line 11. This adjustment in effect yields
a 50 percent or greater rate of return for more than half the
existing capacity, which serves as an incentive to discovery of
a private operator.
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new fields. Hence we have a substantial implicit allowance for
exploration costs.
It need not be said that every item has a wide margin
for error. Indeed, among the lowest-cost suppliers, the order
tells more about our adjustment rules than about true relative
costs. For example, Saudi expenditures were unusually high in
1978 because of a great water-injection project, and oil wells
relatively low, while Libya was completing an unusually large
number of oil wells that year.
For some of these countries, going to 5 percent depletion
involves a very large buildup. For example, in 1978, Saudi
Arabia produced only 2.6 percent of its proved reserves.
We assume that investment per unit is proportional to the
depletion rate. Hence the Saudi investment is increased in the
proportion 5.0/2.6, or by 92 percent. This represents a
considerable overstatement, because reserves would be increasing
along with capacity. We keep the assumption, however, in order
to be consistent with a later treatment. (See below, the "zero
reserves-added model".)
The supply cost for the group as a whole is that for
the highest-cost members, Venezuela and Nigeria. The 1978 cost
(at 1985 factor prices) in Nigeria was $2.00. With much of its
output known to be at higher costs, we multiply the average by
2.5, reaching $5.00. Producing at 5 percent of 1985 proved
21
reserves would be a slightly higher percent of reserves than in
1978, although the absolute amount would be lower, hence the
supply price increases only slightly.
Venezuela and Nigeria are the only countries where
estimating errors make any difference. For the others, even
large relative errors would be negligible in absolute terms. That
is, if the true cost is twice our calculated cost, and the latter
i s 50 cents, the error is only 50 cents. There is no way of
changing the conclusion: in these countries, oil ranges from
cheap to dirt cheap.
Declining oil prices have lowered costs greatly, both
by lower factor prices and by greater efficiency. Costs will
undoubtedly decline from 1985 levels, but we cannot tell by how
much.
How Long Can a Competitive Price be Sustained?
We have assumed that it takes a decade to reach equil-
ibrium. We need to estimate rates of reserve buildup and
drawdown before we can start to answer the ultimate question:
still assuming competition, how long can this price level
be sustained?
World non-Communist consumption in 1985 was 45.5 million
barrels daily [DOE/EIA/ICID, March 1986, p. 10], of which
39 mbd was supplied by crude oil [OGJ March 10, 1986, p. 80],
22
and the rest by natural gas liquids, Communist block exports, and
inventory drawdown. We focus on crude oil supply and demand.
At much lower prices, consumption would increase. We
assume average annual economic growth at 3 percent, and an
oil:GNP ratio annual growth of 2 percent, for an oil consumption
growth rate of 5 percent. 10
Table IV shows that this consumption turnaround could
be supplied entirely from the stock of proved reserves at end-
1985. Non-cartel oil production is assumed to decline steadily
at about 8 percent per year, which is almost surely excessive,
while output of cartel oil (OPEC plus Mexico) would increase by a
factor of three. Most of the growth in cartel output would merely
reactivate capacity already in existence in 1985.
Table IV is a model not merely of zero discoveries but
of zero reserve additions from known fields. In any given time
period these are always the great bulk of all reserve additions.
Nevertheless, there is no problem of supply at the competitive
floor price for a decade. It is during this time that reserves
10 I think the reaction would be slow, because of (1)
improved technology in combustion and building; (2) the developed
countries have been approaching the North American level of
automobile saturation; (3) excise taxation of oil products by
consuming-country governments; (4) the retrofitting
asymmetry. Part of the reaction to higher prices was the altera-
tion of existing structures; but the alteration will not be
undone because of lower prices. Insulation will not be ripped
out of buildings.
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would in fact be added, at the cost per barrel shown in Table
III, to support consumption after 1995.
Sustainability after 1995 It is conservative to assume
that enough additional reserves will be created during ten
years, at the costs shown in Table III, to supply the world for a
few years, at least, past 1995. But we consider it a mistake to
estimate the rate of reserve additions as if they were some kind
of exogenous fact. Reserves are ready shelf inventory. The rate
of reserve-building results from profit-maximizing investment
decisions, which are radically different under
monopoly.
Any monopoly must restrict output in ord
price. Hence there is under-investment. With
competition, the rules governing investment would
upside down to be right side up.
In a competitive market, low-cost sources
faster than high-cost. This was true before
explosion. It was evident in the bitter 20-ye;
United States over restricting imports. Since
been running uphill. Drilling in the USA increa
competition and
er to maintain
a reversion to
again be turned
of supply grow
the 1973 price
ar fight in the
1973, water has
sed by a factor
of four through 1985. In Saudi Arabia, drilling dropped by
thirds, because only sharply lower production would maintain
price.
two
the
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If the monopoly disappeared, and every producer acted
independently, competition would first induce full use of their
existing capacity, and then set them off on an investment
boom. They would hate it, of course, and some of them would have
real financial problems in raising the relatively small amounts
needed. But the only way to save something from the wreck of
the cartel would be to explore, develop, and produce to the
maximum.
The difference between oil and uranium is instructive.
After 1974, the price of uranium soared almost as spectacularly
as oil. But there was no cartel to restrict investment. Accor-
dingly, there was a massive increase in supply. Less than five
years after the first surge, uranium prices began to drop, and
went to the lowest level since they were first recorded. [Neff
1984] The "Neff paradigm" will hold also in oil if the monopoly
disappears; the question is how far down the price will go.
We look first at development of known fields, which provide
the great bulk of new reserves added in any time period.
In 1944, a team of distinguished geologists calculated
Persian Gulf oil reserves at 16 billion proved, 5 probable.
Excluding later discoveries, this has already been surpassed by a
factor of roughly 30. These geologists were neither foolish nor
conservative; as good scientists, they interpreted from the data
known then. As more is known, reserve estimates grow.
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For Saudi Arabia to produce 20 million barrels daily
requires them only to dust off the 1973 plans for 1980. Of the
50 commercial oil fields discovered in that country, only 15 have
been developed. If the price collapses, we will find out how much
is in the other 35.
No OPEC country is as intensively drilled today as was
the USA in 1945. Excluding Alaska, practically all the big
fields had been found before that year. Proved reserves in 1945
were 20 billion barrels. But in the next 40 years the "lower 48"
produced not 20 but 100 billion barrels, and they still have
nearly 20 on the shelf.
Those additional 100-billion barrels plus were no gift of
nature. Through heavy investment, many small fields were
found, and the old fields were greatly expanded. Yet from
1945, at least through 1972, there was no increase in finding-de-
veloping cost. (Great turbulence, and disappearance of some
statistics, make it difficult to say just what happened after-
ward, but there is reason to think the cost may have doubled in
1972-84.)
In Venezuela, another old province, reserves stagnated
until costs began to creep up. They amounted to 18 billion
barrels at end-1978. In the next seven years, another 13 billion
were added, without major discoveries. A nationalized industry
does not have the difficult problem of skimming the operator's
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rents without taking so high a percentage as to reduce the total
take. In Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, and other places,
better terms will be granted to local operating companies because
it will minimize the revenue losses.
Turning now to exploration: it is prudent to assume that the
oil industry will find smaller oil and gas fields than in the
past.11 It does not follow that newly-discovered oil will
be less. It depends on the slope of the size-decline curve
[Smith & Paddock 1984], and on the amount of investment in
exploration.
The most promising areas of the world are the least
explored. In Kuwait, the inadvertent result of drilling for
gas for local power generation was the 1983 discovery of an oil
field of about 30 billion barrels, so cheap to produce that it
will replace part of current production. Kuwait is a tiny
country. Saudi Arabia is as large as Texas and Louisiana
combined. In 1985, those States operated an average of 963
rigs. Saudi Arabia averaged ten (10). Yet Saudi Arabia is a far
better hunting ground. We will find out how much better when and
if the cartel disappears--not before.
Prudence is not necessarily truth. It involves
extrapolating the model of diminishing returns (see next page)
from a given field or "play" to a whole country or continent or
world. The extrapolation, as Kaufman has put it, "breaks the
model's legs in several ways".
In a kind of twilight between
ment are large resources of heavy oil
exploration
s, especially
and devel
in Canada
Venezuela. Much is profitable at a price be
just as high prices and low demand put the
hold, low prices and high demand would make it
In short, the evidence points to a repl
consumption at the cost levels of Table III,
accommodate consumption through 2000 A. D. T
basis for going farther, nor is there any need
marginal cost is an unknown with which buyer
somehow cope. The only meaningful question is
the effect upon the supply price of oil in
unknown chance of sharply rising marginal cost
low $10. Indeed,
Orinoco "belt" on
a major producer.
acement of 1985-95
which is ample to
here is too little
to. The change in
s and sellers must
: what would be
1986-1990 of the
after 2000 A. D.?
Long run cost and price changes
The belief that oil prices must somehow rise i
term is grounded in the fact of diminishing return
assume nothing about "exhaustible resources". The a
mineral in the Earth is unknown, and irrelevant. The
growth" is cost at the margin.
In any mineral industry, ceteris paribus t
deposits are more likely to be found first, even
because they are biggest. The best ones are
first. (Failure to do so, as we saw earlier, implies
n the
is. We
mount
1 "limi
long
need
of a
t to
:he biggest
by chance,
exploited
monopoly
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Hence marginal cost must keep ri
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sing over time, and
price with it. As the cost and price rise, consumption
production dwindles.
Yet for nearly 30
no persistent widespread
actually decline in the 1
by increasing knowledge,
of extraction and use.
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Thus the value of a
uncertainty found in ev,
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That cost is the lesser
future revenues or (b)
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(a)/(b) is familiar to
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es unity. We have an in
the problem at its leisu
ated, the operating con
cents in 1985 prices) for
years it has been clear that there is
upward price drift; most minerals prices
ong run. Diminishing returns are opposed
both of the earth's crust and of methods
The price of oil, like that of any
I fluctuating result of the conflict.
mineral body is subject to the kind of
ery industry. Every mineral or non-min-
a current cost the using-up of assets.
of (a) the present value of the asset's
the present value
 very uncertain,
e
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Ifii
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I
of reprodu
but there i
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for an investment decision.
economists as "Tobin's Q".
portant special case.
)rium, the fraction (a)/(b)
teresting example of a firm w,
re. In 1976, when Aramco was
panies were allowed 6 cents
every barrel discovered.
tion cost.
no escape
In fact,
Mineral
approach-
orking out
expropri-
(about 10
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to
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and
This give
to user cost
not be surpris
(and probable
annual output
incremental Ar
future price.
in Table III,
cost") would b
In 1976,
in the ground
revenue, i. e.
S
)
us
an
a fix on Saudi marginal fi
d marginal revenues. The
nding
1ow V
ring. Given proved reserves of 166 bil
reserves perhaps half again as great),
of 3 billion, the present discounted
'amco barrel was tiny almost without r
Were Aramco producing at the levels
development cost and also resource
e much higher.
in the United States, an undevel
I would sell for several dollars. The
the difference between price and oper
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costs (equal
alue should
lion barrels
and current
value of an
egard to the
hypothesized
value ("user
oped barrel
 future net
-ating-devel-
opment cost, was only a small fraction of the margin in Saudi
Arabia. But the present value of the smaller margin was many
times as great because it would be realized within a few years
not decades or centuries, if at all.
If current information indicates higher prices in the
future, then it pays to refrain from investing in reserves which
would be profitably depleted today, in order to save them for
even more profitable future use. The higher the cost, the
lower the current profit, and the greater the gain from postpone-
ment. 1 2 Or, what comes to the same thing: the lower the cost of
12 Suppose this year's price for some product is $1, the
relevant discount rate is 10 percent, and the best estimate of
next year's price is $1.05. If the marginal cost (bare operating
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creating the reserves (development cost), the lower the opportu-
nity cost (user cost) of producing now rather than deferring
production.
Thus the notion that the cartel nations were reserving
their oil in the ground for later more profitable use is proved
false by the fact that owners of higher-cost oil were striving to
get it out more quickly, while the owners of lower-cost oil
lagged far behind. This upside-down behavior is characteristic of
a non-competitive industry with a competitive fringe.
cost for fac
facilities p
to next yea
year, which
same thing,
makes produ
tions shoul
correlated
greater the
Option
estimate of
the future
the better
will be s
more prol
with zero
value. I
discount
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impossibl(
The
earnings,
operation
one "deel
consisten
resources
ilities in place, development-plus-operating cost for
proposed) is 50 cents, production should be postponed
Ir. That is, the net return would be 55 cents next
is 10 percent above this year. Or, what comes to the
user cost is 5 cents, which added to marginal cost
ction this year unprofitable. But lower cost opera-
d not be postponed. In general, marginal cost is
with Fuser cost; the higher the marginal cost the
gain to postponement.
theory adds another dimension. Suppose we have no
next year's price, but we do have some estimate of
variability of price. The greater its variability,
the chance that some time in the future. the rice
ufficiently higher than now to
'itable as to be worth waiting
or negative current profits may
f there is a market in values,
rate to make a decision. (But
above mere postponement. At
e to resume operation once it is
important point for us is:
the
"out
in
t wi
fir
greater the
of the money
the money" i
th the maxim
st, and also
make production so much
for. Thus an operation
have a positive present
the individual needs no
waiting may have costs
the limit, it may be
halted.)
The lower the current
value of variable expectations. An
"is the best candidate for waiting;
is the poorest. This is perfectly
that we use the lowest-cost mineral
with our thesis that user cost is
positively correlated with development-operating cost.
I
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Moreover, the increased cost of developing known reserves
more intensively puts a limit on what is worth finding; some
years ago, the writer called it Maximum Economic Finding Cost.
[Adelman 1972; and see Devarajan and Fisher 1982] Hence an
estimated increase in development cost is an implicit allowance
for exploration cost.
Our only sensing device for future shortages is a competi-
tive market price. Estimates and models of resources and
reserves are inputs into price formation. Assumptions about
conditions past 2000 A. D. will be discounted so heavily by
rational actors that their influence is minor or imperceptible.
The price reflects all the information, models, guesses,
hypotheses, hunches, and mistakes. The fog surrounding any future
price is like Napoleon's "fog of war". But the estimate of that
future price is subject to constant correction.
The probability of marginal costs rising strongly after
2000 A. D., whatever it may be, will have little near-term
effect, but a substantial effect ten years hence.
It is not unreasonable (even if unproved) to expect the
competitive price of oil to increase over the long run from the
current competitive "shadow price". What must forever amaze the
historian is that when the price of oil was raised far above that
competitive level, and was therefore subject to an additional
downward risk, it was confidently expected to keep increasing.
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[IIASA 1985] is about the most moderate and cautious (as it is
one of the most recent) of innumerable analyses and forecasts of
prices higher than 1981 or 1985.
Price forecasts But even if the price reaches, as
in 1970 it approached, a level which expresses long-run supply
and demand, it will probably not stay there. The cartel members
need not wait for 2000 A. D. or even 1987. Lower sales have not
directly forced down cartel prices. It is rather than lower
revenues have made them resist the need to share burdens. But
if they can make, and, more important, keep an agreement to cut
production, they can quickly raise prices again.
The cartel's basic instability is that a movement in
either direction becomes self-reinforcing and cumulative.
"The better the financial condition of the sellers,...
the less pressure on them to cheat and undersell each other in
order to pay their bills...Once the price begins to slip, the
OPEC nations will be under great pressure to produce more in
order to acquire more revenue, and the more they produce, the
further the price falls. [Adelman 1982]
Most likely, the price will fluctuate between the monopoly
ceiling and the competitive floor. The ceiling seems first to
have been envisaged around $28, but more recently OPEC spokesmen
have spoken of $20. The floor as we perceive it here is about
$8 in the short run, below which there will be large cutbacks in
U. S. production, and $5 in the longer run, which would suffice
to maintain a flow of investment in
the ex-cartel area, and elsewhere.
Concerted output cuts by the
the past be a clumsy way of raising
overshoot felt in 1979-81.
new reserves and capacity
revived cartel would as
the price, with the kind
What should be done to cope with this instability
another question. Pent-up forces often work with violence.
world oil monopoly is both the largest of all time, and also
greatest in the divergence of price from long-run marginal cc
The accumulated tension between actual and competitive mar
conditions is therefore unprecedented.
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TABLE I
DEVELOPMENT & OPERATING COST, OFFSHORE U.K., 1983-84
1982 1983 1984
1 OUTPUT MTY 100.1 110.5 120.8
2 OUTPUT MBD 2.029 2.240 2.449
3 RESERVES (MMBRLS) 7237 6845 5920
4 ANNUAL DEPLETION/DECLINE 0.102 0.119 0.151
5 LOST CAPACITY MBD - - 0.248 0.331
6 GROSS GAIN MBD - - 0.459 0.540
7 DEVELOPMENT IN-
VESTMENT, $MM - - 2727 2862
8 Do., $/IDB - - 5937 5300
9 DEVELOPMENT COST, $/BRL - - 4.57 4.43
10 PRODUCING OUTLAYS ($MM) - - 1863 2135
11 OPERATING COST ($/BRL) - - 2.28 2.39
12 DEVELOPING PLUS OPERATING
COST ($/BRL) - - 6.85 6.82
SOURCE:
U. K. Department of Energy. Development of the
Oil & Gas Resources of the United Kingdom 1985 (HMSO 1985)
and ibid (1984).
Output: Appendix 8, p. 68
Capital expenditures: Appendix 14, p. 77
Operating expenditures: Appendix 14, p. 78
Sterling converted at $1.50
Discount rate at 17 percent nominal
Tonne=7.4 barrels
Lost output is equal to current year output multiplied
by average ratio production/reserves, given year and
preceding year. Gross gain is sum of lost output and
net increase.
Discount rate taken as 16 percent nominal on development
projects. Assumes investor has access to U. S. capital
markets. Rate is sum of 8.0 percent riskless end-1985, and
8.0 percent risk premium on oil and gas operations. The
riskless rate will probably decrease because of lowered
inflation expectations, and the risk premium may increase
because of the perceived greater uncertainty of oil prices.
TABLE II
DEVELOPMENT & OPERATING COST, USA, 1984
DEVELOPMENT
OUTLAYS
(S$MM)
14174
DEVELOPMENT
GROSS COST PER
RESERVES BARREL IN
ADDED GROUND
(MM BRLS) ($)
3748 3.78
RATIO
DEPLETION/ ABOVE- TO
DECLINE IN-GROUND
RATE VALUE
0.115 2.39
DEVELOP-
MENT COST
AS PRODUCED
($)
9.04
…. . . . .................. 1 9 8 2…--------------------
OPERATING OIL OIL OPERA- PRODUCTION OPERATING
OUTLAYS FRACTION TING OUTLAYS MM BRLS COST/BRL
($MM) ($MM) ($)
17453 0.674 11762 2432 4.84
ESTIMATE
3.87
SOURCES:
DEVELOPMENT:Outlays, Census, Annual Survey of Oil & Gas 1982 ad-
justed to 1984 by Joint Association Survey.
Gross reserves added, DOE/EIA
Depletion/decline rate, ratio of production to average
annual proved reserves, per DOE/EIA.
Ratio = (1+(i/a)), where i=discount rate, taken at 16
percent, and a=depletion/decline rate.
OPERATING: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of Oil & Gas 1
Production and expenditures are for the sample of compan
Oil fraction calculated by taking ratio of oil wells to
wells, and assuming gas wells cost one-third more.
Reduced by 20 percent to reflect lower costs. See
Independent Petroleum Association of America, Report of
Study Committee, May (judgmental estimate), showing much
larger decline for drilling expenditures.
TABLE III
DEVELOPMENT-OPERATItNG COSTS
(1978 conditions, adjusted to
. - q
IN OPEC NATIONS
1985 drilli1ng costs)
( 1 9 ) i t
IK.U', a i t ,-- ... -.
1 WELLS DRILLED
2 PF'PROX. AVG. DEPTH (Tft)
3a
3btts
.:l r
1985 AVG. COST/WELL ($MM)
Do. , adjusted
Adjustment class
4 INVESTMENT ($MM)
r1 OUTFUT, TBD
6 OPERATING WELLS
7a AVERAGE, TBD/WELL
7b WTD. AVG. TBD/WELL
8 OIL WELLS DR I LLED
9a NEW CAPACITY, TBD
9b ADJ. NEW CAPACITY,
10a INVESTMENT/BD (T$)
=COST PER BARREL ($)
10b DJ. INVST./BD (T$)
=COST PER BRREL ($)
1 :L SUPPLY PRICE ($/BRL)
12 1978 CF'APCITY, MBD
:L3. 1 78 RESERVES, BE
14 1985 RESERVES, BE
15 1995 POTENTIAL (5%),
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TABLE III (cont.)
1L l Dhabi Ve ez .e -l -a
'TBDIi'~/
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1a 985 AVG. COST/WELL ($MM)
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7a AVERAGE., TBD/WELL
-7b, WTD.. AVkJE. TBD/WELL
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9a NEW C -FACITY., TBD
9b ADJ. NEW CAPACITY,
10a INVESTMENT/BD (T$)
=COST PER BARREL ($)
10b ADJ. INVST. /BD (T$)
=COST PER BARREL ($)
1.1 SUPJFPLY PRICE ($/BRL)
12 1978 CAPACI TY, MBD
13 1978 RESERVES, BB
14 1985 RESERES, EB
15 1995 OTENTIAL (5'.),
16 CUMULATIVE POTENTIAL, MB
17 1995 INVESTMENl/BD (T$)
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TABLE IIT, NOTES AND SOURCES
NOTES: (1) The "2.5" adjustment (line 11) assumes a highly sewed
distribution of well efficiencies and costs, as is true of
an area with a very large number of mostly very small wells.
It is a substantial overstatment for other parts of the world.
(2) It is assumed that the cost per unit is proportional to the
depletion rate. This is usually though not always an overstatment.
Reservoir development shoul, aim to stop well short of the
point where costs go non-linear.
t No oil well drilled in Kuwait in 1978-79.
tt We use data on individual fields' productions for 1975, 1977,
and 1977 to calculate the weighted average daily outputs for
Iraq, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi respectively. Due to this, the
results are then adjusted to 1978 production condition.
ttZ In the calculation of the weighted average daily output
per well, data on individual fields' productions are taken
from the first six months of 1978. For any country whose
total number of oil fields is less than 15, we calculate
the wtd. avg. daily output for all the nation' wells. Otherwise,
we only use the number of wells from its major oil fields in
our calculation.
SOURCE: Wells drilled: "'World Oil', annual International Outlook issue,
August !5, 1979.
Nigeria and Abu Dhabi 'suspended' wells estimated at worldwide
percentage.
Well depth: same source, total footage divided by completions.
Daily output: same source.
Operating wells: same source, included both types: flowing and
artificial lift wells.
Drilling cost: DOE/EIA, Indexes and Estimates of Domestic Well
Drilling Costs 1984 & 1985 (DOE/EIA-0347(84-85)). These are
exclusively onshore wells. Adjustment a is average ratio of total
U.S. to onshore U.S. cost for given well depth, from 1984 Joint
Association Survey. Adjustment b is ratio of maximum to average
composite drilling cost for given depth, from DOE/EIA, op. cit.
Adjustment for non-drilling costs: Bureau of the Census,
Annual Survey of Oil & Gas discontinued after 1982).
Output of newly drilled wells assumed equal to average flow
of existing wells.
Capacity from Petroleum ntelligence Weekly, April 9, 1979.
Year-end reserves from Oil & Gas Journal, issues of December 1978
and 1985.
Weighted average output per well using data from 0 & 6 J,
December 25, 1978, and from nternational petroleum
Encyclopedia, 1976, 1978, and 1979.
Potential defined as a 5 percent depletion rate of reserves
as estimated by 0 & G J. Industry rule of thumb is one-
fifteenth, or 6.67 percent.
Decline assumed as percent roduction is of reserves. Subtracting
it from gross new capacity installed (above, line 9) implies
a net capacity increase of 5.6 percent for 1978.
TABLE IIIa
DEVELOPMENT-OPERATING COSTS
of Oil Fields in Comalcalco and in Gulf of Campeche, Mexico
(1984 conditions and drilling costs)
Comalcalco Gulf of Campeche
I WELLS DRILLED 45 ;5
APPROX. AVG. DEPTH (Tft) 17.286 12.622
.3-^a 1984 AVG. COST/WELL ($MM) 3. 697 4. 291
3b Do., adjusted .697 4.291
3c. Adjustment class
4 INVESTMENT ($MM) 276 249
5 OUTPUT, TBD 721 1738
6 OPERATING WELLS ** 357 100
7a AVERAGE, TBD/WELL 2.020 17.380
7b WTD. AVG. TBD/WELL *** 5.765 18.333
8 OIL WELLS DRILLED 30 27
9a NEW CAPACITY, TBD 61 469
9b ADJ. NEW CAPACITY, TBD 173 495
l)a INVESTMENT/BD (T$) 4. 558 0. 531
=COST PER BARREL ($)
o0b ADJ. INVST./BD (T$) 1.597 0.504
=COST PER BARREL ($)
11 SUPPLY PRICE ($/BRL) 3.992 1.259
12 1984 CAPACITY, TBD 721 1738
13 1984 YEAR-END RESERVES, BB 9.3 31.8
14 1995 POTENTIAL (5%), MD 1.28 4.36
15 CUMULATIVE POTENTIAL, MB 1.28 5.64
16 1995 INVESTMENT/BD (T$) 7.071 3. 158
=COST PER BARREL ($)
TABLE a NOTES ND SOURCES in addition to Table III)
NOTE: tt Data on the numbers of operating wells are as of July 1, 1984.
There are 249 flowing and 108 artificial lift wells in Comalcalco area
and 100 flowing and zero artificial lift wells in Campeche area.
Mtd In the calculation of the weighted average daily production per well,
data on individual fields' daily productions are taken from the first
six months of 1984.
SOURCES: Wells drilled: "Memoria de Labores, 1984', 1985, Instituto exicano
del Petroleo].
Well depths: same source, total footage divided by completions.
Daily output: same source.
1984 year-end reserves: same source, included 5 BB condensate in
both areas.
Drilling cost: 1984 Joint Association Survey.
Since wells in each region are either all onshore or all offshore,
no adjustment is necessary. We use the data on average drilling
cost in the U.S. for given depth in the calculations.
Operating wells: Oil & Gas Journal, December 31, 1984 issue, annual
report on worldwide production.
Weighted average output per well using data from the same source.
Capacity assumed equal to production.
TABLE IV
ZERO DRILLING AND RESERVE-ADDITIONS MODEL, 1985-95
------ (BILLIONS OF
PRODUCTION (MBD)CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION
YEAR CARTEL NONCARTEL CARTEL NONCARTEL
1985 18 21 -
1995 54 9 144 58
1995 PRODUCTION:RESERVES ----------------------->
BARRELS)-
PROVED
CARTEL
46
37
0.05
RESERVES
NONCARTEL
0 159
8 39
2 0.088
SOURCE: 1985,0il & Gas Journal, "World
Cartel includes OPEC nations pl
Non-cartel includes all others
For explanation of 1995 values,
Wide Oil"
us Mexico
outside Communist blocks.
see text.
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SUPPLY CURVE: OPEC 1995
(1985 COST LEVELS, PROD 5% RSVS)
0 20 40 60
CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION, MBD
5
4
3
._
m
I-
(0.0t
z
Ld
o
-z
n~
1
0
_ j
iif·-_ -i--l--:· (··l_.·lr
-·-i 
'1··'. ··1 I' ·, ;-·-I
1·:·
i i
· i ·'': · `
"'
-'
·:"' ·` -'":I' i"
i!' '''' ""' :
; '.
)·_··(·
_·1
i.i..  - -: . .i ' .i · i · i
1 '
:.-.· · .·I' (·I· i ·; --· : 1 i
i':
;-;· ·i ·· . i-.
· ·,-.· .. ,.··.. :··. · ·,· .
.·. ·- · ·
, -· ··; :··
i····; ·; ··! :···:-·· r··· ·:···- ·· -·· ·--:··· :
;···.
: .1··
I "··i!:'
i !· ' · ''
·! : " " ·- I ·
·"
__I·_; (·: _·_
'
''·'"
r · :l_·r~~~~~~r ··,:r 2 ~~~~-''~~~·"r.777,:
:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -
.**, "~ ' '. ~. ; ::q ' . ~- ' E.* -5: * ·. ''
..... : .
L L~; ·E·; " '; Le1 . "
mv r.'-t 7 P I I:
~~~~~~~~~~~·:.,~. .. : · ~.·.~ 
· . ·.. .. ;: - -. ,
1~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~. :..-? ~;P- ..·.. ./..
r 4 -7~~~~~i: .:ii- .1- 
.i- ' : ; :.' ' '-
.. . . . . . . ~-.~,-.~~~..i
~-..--!!~<~.~=  ~ ~ ~ 1·- '.~~ .,'=*-~ ~:.:~;.: C ,'· ·: .. ~.'?'..,., .
:~ .-..- .· ?: 1·
.... · i.- :-' L ~ :-~ ;~\·f:~ -: !·l . .,_-c.7;'
?:I : ?' : :.'
J - 4::': :' -.- :-.- :~
~~~~~J~ ,* .: , . .... ,
_~.,~ i· .... ... ; .a
.... ..-. ..... :  .. :.- :-:.: :..'-: ':
'_~~?.:' .' : ."t i. L ,'.--, S',~:~- -. ' '-·=. :.~;,',". L'..
:~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~-:·.· .:....: r. f :, ,:,: ,,  .  ;.~.. : .-::. : :
rm~. ... ,. J.-'-.4 ... ~ .. ~.L.~...
.:~- ;... ;-...,. , . - :. · .:.:. . ; :' : ·7 :.' . .'. - .. ~.~ ..:
,:::. - -'-.,' ~-. r- .. ~: '":"'' 5C:.::..?~:7 .'!""~:L:'':
:~~··: ~"· .'~:";.r :':' : ':,~i-':.::'' iI".-'..:-~d ':?~,'. .. : .~.:'.'
